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OFFICER PERFORMANCE AND COMPENSATION 
IN LOCAL BUILDING TRADES UNIONS 
RONALD EHRENBERG and STEVEN GOLDBERG 
TPHIS paper presents estimates of the rela-
X tionship between the performance and 
compensation of local building trades union 
leaders. A growing literature has revived 
the common-sense notion that organizations 
should structure the compensation of both 
their employees and their executives so as 
to encourage them to take actions consist-
ent with the goals of the organizations.1 
One way to minimize the probability that 
executives will take actions contrary to the 
organization's goals is to tie their compen-
sation to measures of their organization's 
performance. 
This point is clearly relevant in profit-
making enterprises where shareholders' in-
terests are best served by executives' striving 
This study tests the hypothesis that the salary of 
a local business agent in the building trades is 
related to both the ability to pay of his local 
union and his own bargaining performance, the 
latter measured by a comparison of the wages he 
obtains for his local's members with the wages ob-
tained for the members of other locals. Using pre-
viously unpublished data for 670 locals in eleven 
crafts and sixty-eight cities, the authors And sub-
stantial support for their hypothesis. 
Ronald Ehrenberg is Associate Professor of Eco-
nomics and Labor Economics at Cornell University 
and Steven Goldberg is a graduate student in eco-
nomics at Northwestern University. They are grate-
ful to Jack Whiting for his research assistance and 
to Robert S. Smith for his comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper.—EDITOR 
iSee, for example, Armen Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization," American Economic Review, 
Vol. 62, No. 4 (December 1972), pp. 777-95; and 
Gary Becker and George Stigler, "Law Enforcement, 
Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers," Jour-
nal of Legal Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1974), 
pp. 1-18. 
to maximize the firm's profits. Tying execu-
tives' compensation directly to their firm's 
profitability through stock options or bonus 
schemes is one strategy available to induce 
this behavior/2 Recent empirical evidence 
indicates that business firms do pursue 
such strategies.3 
It should be equally rational for public 
and private nonprofit organizations to tie 
their employees' or executives' compensa-
tion to the achievement of the organiza-
tions' goals, and a number of studies have 
documented that several types of nonprofit 
organizations do. University professors' com-
pensation, for example, appears to be related 
to variables reflecting their contributions 
toward achieving the multiple goals of their 
institutions (research, teaching, and admin-
^William Baumol, Business Behavior, Value, and 
Growth (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 
1967); Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavi-
oral Theory of The Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1963); and Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Mana-
gerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (Engle. 
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967) all discuss 
objectives that executives may wish to pursue that 
conflict with maximizing firms' profits. By tying 
compensation to firms' profitability, the cost of 
pursuing these objectives is increased, thereby re-
ducing the probability that executives will pursue 
them. 
3Sce Robert Masson, "Executive Motivations, Earn-
ings, and Consequent Performance," Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/ 
December 1971), pp. 1278-93. Previous studies, such 
as Wilbur Lewellan, Executive Compensation in the 
Large Industrial Corporation (New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 1968) and J. W. 
McGuire, J. S. Chiu, and A. O. Elbing, "Executive 
Income, Sales, and Profits," American Economic 
Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (September 1962), pp. 753-61, 
were less definitive on this point; their methodo-
logical approaches, however, have been severely 
criticized by Masson. 
188 
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istrative activity).4 Similarly, it has been 
shown that the compensation of a number 
of categories of municipal government offi-
cials (city managers and police and fire 
chiefs) is systematically related to several 
derived measures of their success in meet-
ing municipal taxpayers' objectives.5 
In this paper we extend the previous 
literature by seeking to ascertain if the 
compensation of a category of local build-
ing trades union leaders—chief business 
agents—is related to their performance in 
office, That is, are these officers rewarded 
for taking actions consistent with their 
members' best interests? An analysis of this 
question is greatly complicated by the mul-
tiplicity of tasks faced by local union offi-
cers, especially business agents, and the 
existence of geographic and occupational 
interdependencies in collective bargaining 
in the building trades industry. 
The plan of our paper is as follows: In 
the next section we consider the problems 
involved in attempting to measure the per-
formance of union officers and suggest 
several proxy measures. The third section 
outlines our empirical model of local union 
officers' compensation, discusses our data 
sources, and presents some summary statis-
tics calculated from the data. Our empirical 
estimates of the determinants of local 
union leaders' compensation, based upon a 
sample of records from 670 local unions 
representing eleven crafts in sixty-eight 
large cities, are presented in the fourth 
section. Finally, we offer some brief con-
cluding comments. 
Studies of the determinants of the com-
pensation of local building trades union 
leaders have been conducted previously, 
but they have primarily been descriptive, 
two-way tabulations of local union leaders' 
compensation and local unions' character-
<Davld Kalz, "Faculty Salaries, Promotions, and 
Productivity at a Large University," American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 63, No. 8 (June 1978), pp. 469-
77, and John Sigfried and Kenneth White, "Finan-
cial Rewards to Research and Teaching: A Case 
Study of American Economists," American Economic 
Review, Vol. 68, No. 2 (May 1973), pp. 309-15, are 
representative of this literature. 
"Gerald S. Goldstein and Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 
"Executive Compensation in Municipalities," South-
ern Economic Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1 (July 1976), 
pp. 987-47. 
istics (such as size) without any behavioral 
model.0 One previous study did provide a 
multivariate analysis of local union leaders' 
compensation.7 Unfortunately, it was con-
fined to a single geographic area, ignored 
the geographic and occupational interde-
pendency of collective bargaining in the 
industry, and contained an estimating equa-
tion with a functional form that was, as 
explained below, misspecified. 
Measurement of Leaders' Performance 
Local building trades unions elect nu-
merous officials, including some who are 
salaried. Typically each local elects a full-
time, salaried business agent who has pri-
mary responsibility for industrial relations 
in the union.8 One important function of 
business agents is to represent the local in 
its collective bargaining negotiations; others 
include representing the local before legal 
bodies, handling grievances of the local's 
members, directing strikes and boycotts, de-
fending the jurisdiction of the local, and 
policing and enforcing provisions of con-
tracts. Given these numerous tasks, any 
complete measure of a business agent's per-
formance would necessarily have many 
dimensions. For the purpose of this paper, 
however, we focus on a single dimension: 
the level of compensation the business agent 
attains at the bargaining table for his local's 
members. 
oSee Leon Applebaum, "Officer Turnover and 
Salary Structure in Local Unions," Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (January 
1966), pp. 224-80; Leon Applebaum, "A Comparison 
of Officer Turnover and Salary Structures in Local 
Unions," Labor Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 12 (Decem-
ber 1969), pp. 795-802; and Harry Blaine and Leon 
Applebaum, "Compensation and Turnover of Union 
Officers," Industrial Relations, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 
1975), pp. 156-57. 
rBarry Bressler, "The Salaries of Union Officials 
with Specific Reference to the Construction Indus-
try," Economic and Business Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 1 
(Spring/Summer 1972), pp. 46-60. 
, «This paragraph is based upon material found 
in Daniel Quinn Mills, Industrial Relations and 
Manpower in Construction (Cambridge, Mass.: 
M.I.T. Press, 1972); Van Dusen Kennedy and Wilma 
Rule Krauss, The Business Agent and His Union 
(Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of Industrial Relations, 
1955); and George Strauss, Unions in the Building 
Trades (Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Buffalo Press, 
1958). 
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Collective bargaining agreements in the 
building trades industry are typically nego-
tiated for a local union for a single craft 
in a particular geographic area.9 Bargain-
ing in the industry is notoriously interde-
pendent, however, with local union mem-
bers being concerned not only with the 
absolute level of their wages but also with 
their wages relative to the wages of other 
crafts in the same city and to the wages in 
their craft in other cities.10 
It is not a priori obvious whether union 
members evaluate business agents' perform-
ance with reference to percentage or abso-
lute wage differentials. Therefore we spe-
cify two sets of measures of business agents' 
performance for use in our empirical anal-
ysis: (1) a set based upon percentage differ-
entials: the journeyman wage scale for their 
particular local union relative to the aver-
oExceptions to this rule are national or regional 
agreements covering the construction or installa-
tion of pipelines, sprinkler systems, and elevators, 
with local union wages in the last case being re. 
lated to the wages of other local crafts in the area 
by a fixed formula. Also, several crafts in other 
sectors of the industry often engage in regional 
bargaining, often by metropolitan area, in the west-
ern section of the country. See Mills, Industrial 
Relations and Manpower in Construction, for de-
tails. We attempt to take account of these exceptions 
in our empirical work below (see footnote 22). 
ioFor elaborations on this point, see Gordon Ber-
tram and Sherman Maisel, Industrial Relations in 
the Construction Industry (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute 
of Industrial Relations, 1955); Margaret Chandler, 
"Craft Bargaining" in John Dunlop and Neal 
Chamberlain, eds., Frontiers of Collective Bargain-
ing (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); John 
Dunlop, "The Industrial Relations System in Con-
struction" in Arnold Weber, ed., The Structure of 
Collective Bargaining (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1961); Alan Gustman and Martin Segal, 
"Wages, Wage Supplements, and the Interaction of 
Bargains in the Construction Industry," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Janu-
ary 1972), pp. 179-86; Alan Gustman and Martin 
Segal, "The Skilled-Unskilled Wage Differential in 
Construction," Industrial and Labor Relations Re-
view, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jam,ary 19?4)< PP- 179-86; 
Kenneth McCaffree, "Regional Labor Agreements 
in the Construction Industry," Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July 1956), pp. 
595-609; Mills, Industrial Relations and Manpower 
in Construction; Albert Rees, "The Construction 
Industry Stabilization Committee: Implications for 
Phase II," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu-
tion, 1971), pp. 760-68; and Strauss, Unions in the 
Building Trades. 
age journeyman wage scale in the city 
(RWi) and the journeyman wage scale for 
their local relative to the average national 
journeyman wage in the craft (RWt)', (2) 
a set based upon absolute differentials: the 
journeyman wage scale for their particular 
local union minus the average journeyman 
wage scale in the city {DWJ) and the jour-
neyman wage scale for their local minus 
the average national journeyman wage in 
the craft (DW?). 
Our use of the these measures indicates 
our belief that union members are more 
concerned with the level of their relative 
position at a point in time than with 
recent changes in their relative position.11 
Put another way, our belief is that unions 
whose members' wages are relatively high 
will not penalize their leaders if they attain 
smaller than average percentage or abso-
lute wage gains in a given year because of 
the members' awareness of the difficulties 
involved in trying to maintain an "out-
lier" position (the phenomenon of regres-
sion to the mean). 
An Empirical Model of Compensation 
The objective of this paper is to relate 
local union leaders' compensation to their 
performance. Broadly defined, a leader's 
compensation may be increased in two 
ways: first, through increases in monetary 
payments or fringe benefits; second, through 
being retained in office. Business agents 
and other officials are political figures who 
must stand for reelection periodically (at 
one- to three-year intervals in the case of 
business agents) and thus local member 
satisfaction with their performance may be 
reflected by their not being voted out of 
office as well as by increases in their com* 
pensation. Unfortunately, because of the 
cross-sectional nature of our data, we are 
restricted to considering only the impact 
of performance on monetary payments to 
officers.12 Hence the results presented below 
"If the opposite were true, the relevant perform. 
ance measures would be the changes or percentage 
changes in RWt and RW^ (or DWt and DW2). 
"Research on the determinants of local union 
officials' tenure is currently being conducted by a 
Ph.D. candidate under Glen Cain's direction at 
Wisconsin. 
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understate the total incentive effect for 
performance that business agents face. 
Our basic hypothesis is that local union 
leaders' compensation is related both to 
measures of the union's ability to pay and 
to measures of their agents' performance, 
Empirically, this is reflected in cross-section 
estimating equations of the form: 
(1) Su 
and 
0o< + &\<Kui + faiXm 
+ Mtn + MWui 
(2) Su = ao< + auXui + otaXut 
+ auXui + <*U{RWUI){XMJ) 
+ aM(*W«/)(*«/) + Ui 
where: 
Su 
Xuj 
Xuj 
Xw 
- chief business agent's salary in 
craft i in city,/; 
— total annual local union dues col-
lected in craft i in city,/; 
= total "journeymen-equivalent" 
members in the union represent-
ing craft tin city j \ 1 1 
= total net assets of the local union 
representing craft i in city,/;14 
RWui = journeyman wage scale in craft i 
in city j relative to the average 
journeyman wage scale in city j ; 
RW%u - journeyman wage scale in craft i 
in city j relative to the average 
""journeymen-equivalent" members is calculated 
by dividing reported average monthly dues received 
by the local by monthly dues per journeyman. The 
level of dues often differs for apprentices, helpers, 
journeymen, and retirees; as the percentage com-
position of a union's members across these classes 
varies, our estimate will also vary. 
"The net assets of the American labor move-
ment were estimated to be about $2.25 billion or 
$124 per mtmber in 1969 by Leo Troy, "The 
Finances of American Unions, 1962-69," Explora-
tions in Economic Research, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 
1975). Most unions keep the majority of their assets 
in the form of cash or liquid assets to maintain 
liquidity in case of a strike. The major source of 
revenue for local unions is of course the flow of 
local membership dues. The mean per member 
level of assets in our sample varied across crafts 
from about $50 to $100 and the mean level per 
local from about f 12,000 (marble setters) to $14,000 
(plumbers). Troy's figures include assets held by 
national unions, but our figures refer only to local 
union assets. 
national journeyman wage scale 
in craft i; 
DWUJ = journeyman wage scale in craft i 
in city j minus the average jour-
neyman wage scale in city j ; and 
DWiu = journeyman wage scale in craft i 
in city j minus the average na-
tional journeyman wage scale in 
craft t. 
Variants of Equations 1 and 2 in which 
the "absolute differential" performance 
measures (DWt and DW?) replace the "per-
centage differential" measures (RWi and 
RW?) are also specified but not shown 
(Equations 8 and 4). Two features of these 
equations should be noted. First, total an-
nual dues (Xx), total "journeymen-equiva-
lent" members (X2), and total net assets 
(X3) of the local union are included as 
measures of the local union's ability to pay 
its officers. In a more complete model all 
of these ability-to-pay variables might be 
considered endogenous, as they are at least 
partially determined by previous and cur-
rent wage scales of union members and the 
number and duration of strikes conducted 
by the local union in the past. Since we 
lack data on their determinants, however, 
these variables are treated as exogenous for 
the purpose of this study.18 As might be 
expected, these variables are strongly cor-
related across locals within a craft and it is 
difficult to estimate their independent 
effects precisely. 
Second, Equation 2 specifies that the mar-
ginal impact of performance on the level 
of union leaders' compensation is a func-
tion of the size of the local union. That is, 
it is hypothesized that the magnitude of the 
increase in salary a business agent receives 
if he achieves a given level of performance 
will be larger in a large than a small local 
union, since the larger the union, the larger 
the total increase in earnings received by 
the members. Although this seems like a 
plausible hypothesis, one might also argue 
that the impact of performance is invariant 
"An interesting extension of the present study 
would be to consider their determinants explicitly. 
One might develop a model of the supply and 
demand for union services, for example, and derive 
a reduced form estimating equation for the market 
clearing price (such as monthly dues per man). 
Sadly, our data do not permit us to do this. 
Copyright (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company 
Copyright (c) Cornell University 
Ehrenberg, Ronald, Officer Performance and Compensation in Local Building Trades Unions , 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30:2 (1977:Jan.) p.188 
Ehrenberg, Ronald, Officer Performance and Compensation in Local Building Trades Unions , 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30:2 (1977:Jan.) p.188 
OFFICER PERFORMANCE IN LOCAL UNIONS 198 
ures, were not statistically significant. This 
was due to both the small number of de-
grees of freedom for some crafts and the 
presence of multicollinearity among the 
ability-to-pay variables within each craft. 
In an attempt to alleviate these prob-
lems, Equations 1 and 2 and their variants 
were reestimated with all of the observa-
tions pooled into one sample in four differ-
ent manners: (a) all coefficients constrained 
to be the same across crafts, (b) all coeffi-
cients except the intercept terms constrained 
to be the same across crafts, (c) all coeffi-
cients except the intercept terms and the 
coefficient of RWa (or DW2) constrained to 
be the same across crafts, and (d) all coeffi-
cients except the intercept terms and the 
coefficients of RWt and RWa (or DWX and 
DWj) constrained to be the same across 
crafts. Based upon the residual sum of 
squares from these equations, formal F tests 
were conducted to see which, if any, of the 
above restrictions do not significantly re-
duce the explanatory power of the model. 
These tests indicated that the restrictions 
imposed in (c) did not significantly reduce 
the explanatory power of the model as com-
pared to (he unconstrained (separate equa-
tion for each craft) case. Furthermore, the 
restrictions imposed in (c) did not signifi-
cantly reduce the explanatory power of the 
model as compared to case (d). However, 
requiring that the coefficient of the within-
craft performance measure be constant 
across crafts (cases (a) and (b)) did signifi-
cantly reduce the explanatory power of the 
model as compared to the unconstrained 
case. Consequently, we conclude that pool-
ing the data across crafts is permissible if 
done as in case (c) and in Table 2 we pre-
sent estimates of Equations 1 and 2 and 
their variants, which replace RWX and 
RW* by DWt and DW2 (Equations 8 and 
4). 
Pooling the data substantially improves 
the precision of our estimates. As expected, 
total dues and net local assets tend to be 
significantly related to chief business agents' 
salaries.19 The local union's wage scale, 
however, relative to (or minus) the average 
wage scale of all crafts in the city is not a 
significant determinant of chief business 
agents' salaries in any specification.20 
Focusing on the adjusted coefficients of 
determination (R8), it is quite clear that 
Equation 2, which utilizes a percentage 
differential performance measure and pos-
tulates that the impact of performance on 
local union leaders' salary is proportional 
to the size of the local, is the preferred 
specification.21 For this specification, the 
coefficient of the within-craft performance 
measure (RW?) is positive, as predicted, in 
ten of eleven cases and statistically signifi-
cant for five of the crafts. Moreover, similar 
patterns can be observed for the within-
craft performance measures in the less-
preferred Equations 1, 8, and 4. Taken 
together, these estimates provide initial evi-
dence that performance in office influences 
local building trades leaders' compensa-
tion.22 
"The insignificant coefficients obtained for the 
number of "full-time equivalent" members may be 
due to measurement error in this variable (see 
footnote 18). 
20One possible explanation for the poor perform-
ance of this variable is that the use of the average 
building trades journeyman wage scale in the city 
in the denominator may be a misspecificatlon. That 
is, the denominator will vary across cities, even if 
each building trade's journeyman wage Is the same 
in all cities, simply because the occupational mix 
of journeymen varies across cities. This suggests 
that either a fixed weight index or the use of a 
single craft's wage as a base might have been pref-
erable. Unfortunately, data on building trades em-
ployment levels by occupation and city are not 
available to use in constructing such an index and 
it was not clear, in the latter case, what the appro-
priate base wage craft would have been. The use 
of a simple average across the eleven crafts in a 
city is an alternative to our approach; however, 
preliminary experiments with this measure at early 
stages in our research did not yield significantly 
different results. 
aiEquations were also estimated in which RWit 
RW2> RWi• X2, and RWa • X2 appeared. However, 
formal F tests indicated the inclusion of RWi and 
RWi did not significantly improve the explanatory 
power over Equation 2. 
"We noted in footnote 9 that regional bargain-
ing occurs in some crafts in the West. To see if 
including western cities distorted our estimates, we 
eliminated sixteen western cities from our sample 
and reestimated Equation 2. Estimates obtained 
from this reduced sample differed only marginally 
from those found in Table 2 and hence are not pre-
sented here. We also noted previously the unique 
bargaining framework under which the wages of 
elevator constructors are tied to the wage scales of 
other crafts in the area. The significant performance 
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appear to be rewarded quite well for their 
efforts." 
Qualifications and Conclusion 
This paper has presented estimates of 
the relationship between several proxy 
measures of performance and compensa-
tion of local building trades union leaders. 
Although the evidence is not totally unam-
biguous, it does appear that chief business 
agents' salaries are increased when their 
members' wage scales are raised relative to 
the national average union wage scale for 
the craft—and therefore that local build-
ing trades union leaders are rewarded for 
this dimension of their performance. 
Rather surprisingly, however, the level of 
the members' wages relative to the wages of 
other building trades union members in 
the city does not appear to influence the 
officers' compensation measures. As sug-
gested earlier (in footnote 20), this result 
may be due to an error-in-variables prob-
lem. Or it may reflect the following: An 
increase in the average wage in a city, 
ceteris paribus, might lead to an increase 
in leaders' salaries for cost-of-living reasons, 
even though measured performance might 
actually decline—once again indicating 
that the coefficient of the within-city per-
formance measure might be biased down-
wards. Attempts were made to test this con-
jecture by including the average building 
trades union wage scale in the city as a 
separate independent variable in our anal-
ysis, but severe collinearity problems pre-
vented us from obtaining any meaningful 
results. 
One might argue that our results indi-
cate only that there exists a rigid internal 
wage structure within each local union in 
which the wages of union leaders are speci-
fied as multiples of the journeymen wage 
scale. Indeed, recently the bricklayers' union 
voted to tie future wage gains of their 
national leaders to the members' wage 
2* We also attempted to ascertain whether our 
estimated absolute and percentage impacts were cor-
related with the mean level of officer compensation 
or per-member compensation in the craft. Our goal 
was to see if in crafts in which leaders had the 
greatest incentive to perform, their salaries tended 
to be higher. Unfortunately, with only eleven ob-
servations we could not obtain strong evidence on 
this point. 
scale gains.38 Such schemes do have the 
effect of giving union leaders incentives to 
push for higher wage scales for their mem-
bers, however, and hence do not contradict 
the argument we have presented here. 
We must emphasize that due to the 
limited nature of the data available to us, 
our results should be viewed only as a sug-
gestive first effort. It is clear that we were 
forced to omit a number of variables that 
might potentially bias our results. Tenure 
in office (itself endogenous), for example, 
reflects cumulative performance over a 
number of years and we might reasonably 
expect recently elected business agents to 
be paid less than experienced ones. In addi-
tion, our single year's cross-sectional anal-
ysis cannot capture fully the lags that may 
exist between officers' salaries and perform-
ance. Including lagged values of perform-
ance, say RWx and RW? for the previous 
year, would probably not fully solve this 
problem because the lag structure may vary 
across crafts or locals within a craft. Even 
if the lag structure did not vary, since con-
tracts vary in length and are negotiated 
on a staggered basis, our estimated coeffi-
cients are unlikely to capture fully the true 
relationship between performance and 
compensation. 
In addition to trying to take account of 
the above problems, the logical extensions 
of our analysis are two fold. First, given 
enough resources, one could obtain time-
series data from the Labor Department for 
a subset of local unions and estimate for 
which locals (if any) the change in union 
leaders' compensation was related to the 
change in their measured performance. One 
could then test whether union wage scales 
increased most rapidly in those locals that 
did tie their leaders' salaries to perform-
ance. Second, one could test whether local 
union leaders' tenure in office and prob-
ability of being reelected to office are re-
lated to their performance. Together, these 
extensions should provide strong evidence as 
to whether the compensation of local build-
ing trades union officials is currently struc-
tured rationally, from the union members' 
viewpoint. Our results tentatively suggest 
that it is. 
8» See AFL-CIO News, Washington, D.C., Septem-
ber 27,1975. 
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